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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case   
Cody James Fortin appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 In 2009, Fortin stabbed another individual in the face and shoulder with a 
knife, causing significant injuries.  See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069, 2012 
Unpublished Opinion No. 454 at p.1 (Idaho App. April 30, 2012).  The state 
charged Fortin with aggravated battery and the deadly weapon sentencing 
enhancement.  See id.  After a trial, the jury found Fortin guilty as charged.  See 
id. at p.2.  The district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 12 years 
fixed.  See id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Fortin’s conviction on direct 
appeal.  Id.    
In a separate case, Fortin pled guilty to aggravated battery on a law 
enforcement officer.  See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 40602, 2013 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 748 (Idaho App. Nov. 8, 2013).  The district court ran Fortin’s 
sentence in that case consecutively to Fortin’s sentence previously imposed in 
the aggravated battery case.  See id. 
 In May 2013, Fortin filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  (R., 
pp.5-16.)  Fortin alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in numerous 
respects.  (Id.)  Relevant to this appeal, Fortin asserted that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to advise him that, by rejecting the state’s plea offer to 
resolve both cases, Fortin potentially faced the imposition of consecutive 
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sentences on his aggravated battery and aggravated battery on a law 
enforcement officer convictions.   (R., pp.8-9, 15.) 
 Within the post-conviction petition itself (R., p.11), and in a separate 
motion (R., p.26), Fortin requested that the district court take judicial notice of the 
entire underlying criminal record in both the aggravated battery case and the 
aggravated battery of law enforcement officer case.  Fortin also requested the 
appointment of counsel.  (R., pp.11, 23-24.)  The district court denied Fortin’s 
“blanket request” to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal cases.1  (R., 
pp.126-127).  Fortin did not subsequently attempt to narrow his request, or to 
identify any specific documents from the underlying cases.2  The district court 
granted Fortin’s motion for appointment of counsel.  (R., p.121.) 
                                                        
1 In its order granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court 
noted that it had “[taken] judicial notice of the underlying files that were made a 
part of the record in this case.”  (R., p.158.)  Because the district court previously 
and expressly denied Fortin’s “blanket request for judicial notice” (R., p.127), the 
state presumes that the district court granted the state’s motion for judicial notice 
with respect to the documents that the state actually attached to its motion.  (See 
R., pp.35-95.)  These documents include: the parties’ briefing in Fortin’s direct 
appeal from his aggravated battery conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals’ 
unpublished opinion in Fortin’s direct appeal from his aggravated battery 
conviction, the register of actions in both of Fortin’s underlying criminal cases, 
and Fortin’s initial and amended post-conviction petitions associated with his 
aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer conviction.  (See R., pp.37-95.)   
Because the state attached these documents to its motion to take judicial notice, 
they are all a part of the appellate record in this case.  (See id.)     
 
2 Stating that “it does not appear that the District Court took judicial notice of the 
underlying...case,” the Idaho Supreme Court denied Fortin’s subsequent request 
to augment the appellate record with the underlying criminal record associated 
with his direct appeal from his aggravated battery conviction, Docket No. 38069.  
(10/5/15 “Motion to Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule”; 10/14/15 Order 




 The district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of the 
post-conviction petition, concluding that Fortin failed to allege facts, which, if true, 
would have entitled him to relief as to any of his claims.  (R., pp.156-172.)  Fortin 























 Fortin states the issues on appeal as:  
 
A. Did the District Court violate its mandatory duty to take 
judicial notice of the record of the underlying and related 
criminal cases and thereby prejudice Mr. Fortin?  
 
B. In denying Mr. Fortin’s motion for judicial notice did the 
District Court deny his state and federal constitutional rights 
to access the courts?  Art. I, § 18; Fourteenth Amendment[?]  
 
C. Did Mr. Fortin raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise 
him of the potential consequences of not accepting the 
State’s plea offer?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Fortin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his blanket request to take judicial notice of the entire underlying 
criminal record? 
 
2. Has Fortin failed to show fundamental constitutional error in the district 
court’s decision to deny his blanket request to take judicial notice of the 
underlying criminal record? 
 
3. Has Fortin failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to advise him of the potential consequences of not accepting the 









Fortin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Blanket Request To Take Judicial Notice Of The Entire Underlying 
Criminal Record 
 
A. Introduction   
Fortin contends that the district court violated I.R.E. 201(d) by denying his 
blanket request to take judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal record 
relating to his aggravated battery conviction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.)  A 
review of the record reveals that the district court properly exercised its discretion 
to deny Fortin’s request because Fortin did not comply with the requirements of 
I.R.E. 201(d).  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 A court’s decision to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact is a 
determination that is evidentiary in nature and is governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence.  Newman v. State, 149 Idaho 225, 233 P.3d 156 (Ct. App. 2010); I.R.E. 
201.  An appellate court reviews lower court decisions admitting or excluding 
evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.  Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 
752, 755, 40 P.3d 110, 113 (2002).  
 The interpretation of court rules presents a question of law over which 
appellate courts exercise free review.  State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91-92, 90 






C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Fortin’s 
Blanket Request To Take Judicial Notice Of The Underlying Criminal File 
 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d) provides: 
When a party makes an oral or written request that a court 
take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court 
file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the 
specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is 
requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties 
copies of such documents or items.  A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information. 
 
 Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(d) creates, by its plain language, a mandatory 
duty for a court to, upon the request of a party, take judicial notice of documents 
from a court file when certain requirements are met.  Specifically, pursuant to this 
rule, a party “shall” either “identify the specific documents or items,” or “proffer to 
the court and serve on all parties copies of such documents or items.”  I.R.E. 
201(d).  Where a party does not provide the court with this “necessary” 
information, the mandatory duty of I.R.E. 201(d) does not apply.   To the contrary, 
where a party “does not meet this requirement it is improper for a court to take 
judicial notice under I.R.E. 201(d).”  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835-836, 
243 P.3d 642, 651-652 (2010).     
In this case, Fortin requested that the district court take judicial notice of 
the “entire underlying record(s)” in both his aggravated battery case and his 
separate aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer case.  (R., pp.11, 26.) 
Fortin did not specifically identify any particular documents, nor did he provide 
copies of any documents to the court or to the state.  (See id.)  Fortin thus did not 
comply with the requirements of I.R.E. 201(d).  Correspondingly, the court denied 
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Fortin’s “blanket request” for judicial notice, stating that “the proper procedure is 
for the Court to take note of specific matters that are part of the files,” and that it 
would “take judicial [notice] of those items in the underlying files that are made a 
part of this file.”   (R., pp.126-127.)   Because Fortin did not subsequently make 
any documents from the underlying cases a part of the post-conviction case file, 
the district court never took judicial notice of these documents.    
 Because Fortin failed to comply with the requirements of I.R.E. 201(d), the 
district court had no mandatory duty to grant Fortin’s blanket request that it take 
judicial notice of documents from the underlying criminal cases.  Indeed, absent 
compliance with this rule, it would have been error for the district court to take 
judicial notice.  Fortin has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying this request.  
 
II. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Constitutional Error In The District 
Court’s Decision To Deny His Blanket Request To Take Judicial Notice Of The 
Underlying Criminal Record 
 
A. Introduction   
For the first time on appeal, Fortin contends that the district court violated 
his state and federal constitutional due process rights by denying his blanket 
request to take judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal record.  









B. Standard of Review 
The appellate courts of this state will only review unpreserved assertions 
of error under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Commit Constitutional Error When It Denied 
Fortin’s Blanket Request To Take Judicial Notice Of the Underlying 
Criminal File 
  
Because Fortin failed to raise a constitutional challenge to the district 
court’s denial of his motion for judicial notice, he must demonstrate fundamental 
error on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  To do so, Fortin must 
demonstrate: (1) a constitutional violation; (2) that the violation is clear and 
obvious without the need for additional information not contained in the appellate 
record; and (3) that prejudice resulted.  Id.  Fortin cannot make such a showing. 
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the 
requirement that “prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge 
unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional 
rights.”  Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–414 (1989).  Related to this 
right to access the courts, a defendant in a criminal case has a due process right 
to “a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the 
errors alleged regarding the proceedings below.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 
462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison 
Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). 
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As discussed in Sec. I, supra, I.R.E. 201(d) provides that a district court 
has the mandatory duty to grant a party’s request to take judicial notice of 
documents from a court file only where the party either identifies the specific 
documents or items, or provides the requested documents to the court and 
serves them on the parties.  Fortin’s motion for judicial notice did not comply with 
this requirement and the district court denied his motion.  (R., pp.11, 26, 126-
127.)  Fortin subsequently had the opportunity to file a new rule-conforming 
motion to request judicial notice, but declined to do so.   Therefore, in order to 
show a constitutional violation, Fortin must demonstrate that the requirements of 
I.R.E. 201(d) are unconstitutional and that he was entitled to judicial notice 
notwithstanding these requirements.   Fortin has not attempted to do so.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)   
None of the authorities or general legal principles relied upon by Fortin 
stand for the proposition that a trial court has the constitutional duty to grant a 
blanket request to take judicial notice of an entire criminal record where the 
defendant has not identified specific documents or provided copes of any 
documents to the court or other parties.  Further, I.R.E. 201(d) provides an 
individual the opportunity to develop a record “sufficient for adequate appellate 
review” by requiring a district court to take judicial notice of documents from court 
files that are specifically identified by the individual or provided by the individual 
to the court.  
Fortin has failed to show constitutional error, let alone clear and obvious 
constitutional error that satisfies any of the prongs of the Perry fundamental error 
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test.  This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of 
Fortin’s post-conviction petition.  
 
III. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To 
Advise Him Of The Potential Consequences Of Not Accepting The State’s Plea 
Offer 
 
A. Introduction   
Fortin contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)  Specifically, Fortin 
contends that he raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that, by rejecting the 
state’s plea offer, he potentially faced the imposition of consecutive sentences.3  
(Id.)   
 
B. Standard of Review 
 “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
                                                        
3 On appeal, Fortin does not identify any specific consequences that his trial 
counsel allegedly failed to advise him about.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)   
The state will thus address the specific alleged consequence identified by the 
district court in its order granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal – that  
trial counsel was allegedly ineffective for failing to advise Fortin that, if he went to 
trial and was found guilty, the district court could impose consecutive sentences. 




C. Fortin Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect To 
His Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise 
Him Of The Potential Consequences Of Not Accepting The State’s Plea 
Offer 
  
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983).    
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).  
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true.  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975).  However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
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137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome 
of the proceeding would have been different.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 
241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999).  The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel applies to advice given in the course of plea negotiations.  See Missouri 
v. Frye, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, 132 
S.Ct. 1376 (2012). 
In this case, the state first notes that, due to Fortin’s failure to file a rule-
conforming motion to take judicial notice, the appellate record does not contain 
the clerk’s record or transcripts associated with Fortin’s underlying criminal 
cases.  Missing portions of the record must be presumed to support the decision 
of the trial court.  State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996).  
In his post-conviction petition, Fortin asserted that his trial counsel’s 
advice to proceed to trial on the aggravated battery charge constituted 
“substandard performance” and that counsel failed to advise him that, by 
proceeding to trial, he potentially faced consecutively imposed sentences.  (R., 
pp.8-9.)  In an affidavit submitted in support of his petition, Fortin asserted that 
had he not been “convincingly counseled” by his trial counsel that he could 
prevail at a jury trial, he would have accepted the state’s plea offer.  (R., p.15.)     
The district court summarily dismissed this claim.  (R., p.163.)  In making 
this determination, the district court relied upon the prejudice prong of Strickland.  
(Id.)  The district court concluded that, even assuming that trial counsel’s advice 
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regarding the state’s plea offer was deficient, Fortin could not demonstrate 
prejudice because he could not “demonstrate that the Court would have 
accepted his plea as a binding plea agreement under I.C.R. 11.”  (Id.)  The 
district court added that, “as a general practice,” it does not accept binding plea 
agreements.  (Id.)  Fortin has failed to show error in this determination.  
 In Lafler, the parties stipulated that trial counsel provided deficient 
performance by failing to timely inform the defendant of the state’s plea offer.  
Lafler, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 1383.  In determining whether the defendant 
had demonstrated prejudice from the deficiency, the Supreme Court stated: 
In these circumstances a defendant must show that but for the 
ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that 
the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 
defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would 
not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the 
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or 
sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less 





 The United States Supreme Court elaborated on this standard in Frye, 
stating:  
It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges 
are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and 
sentences.  So in most instances it should not be difficult to make 
an objective assessment as to whether or not a particular fact or 
intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal course, to 
cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea 
bargain.  The determination that there is or is not a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different absent counsel’s errors can be conducted within that 
framework. 
 
Frye, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 1410. 
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 In this case, as the district court properly concluded, Fortin failed to 
present any evidence that the court would have been willing to be bound by an 
I.C.R. 11 plea agreement to impose concurrent sentences,4 or that the court 
would follow such a recommendation in making a discretionary sentencing 
determination.  Further, there is no indication in the available record that the 
district court would have imposed concurrent sentences.  The district court was in 
an appropriate position to make an “objective assessment” as to whether it would 
have agreed to be bound by an I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, and concluded, “within 
that framework,” that it does not accept such binding agreements as a general 
practice. 
 In the alternative, this Court may affirm the district court’s summary 
dismissal of Fortin’s post-conviction petition on any ground set forth by the state 
in its motion for summary dismissal.  While a post-conviction petitioner is entitled 
to notice prior to the summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims from either 
the court or from the state’s motion to dismiss, I.C. § 19-4906; Kelly v. State, 149 
Idaho 517, 522-523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282-1283 (2010), an order of summary 
dismissal may be affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the state’s 
motion to dismiss if no material issue of fact on those grounds in contained in the 
record.  See Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); 
Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 864-865, 243 P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010).  
                                                        
4 The state disputed Fortin’s contention that it offered to recommend concurrent 
sentences as part of its plea offer.  (R., pp.30-31, 100-101.)  However, for the 
purposes of its determination regarding the state’s motion for summary dismissal, 
the district court was required to accept Fortin’s contention as true.  See Cooper, 
96 Idaho at 545, 531 P.2d at 1190. 
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 In this case, there was no nexus between Fortin’s potential “exposure” to 
consecutive sentences and his factual assertions regarding his theoretical 
likelihood to accept the state’s plea offer.  Specifically, Fortin did not allege that 
he would have taken the plea offer if he had known that the district court could 
impose consecutive sentences.  Instead, he alleged only that he would have 
accepted the state’s plea offer had he not been “counseled convincingly” by his 
trial counsel that he would prevail at trial.  (R., p.15.)  As the state argued in its 
motion for summary dismissal, Fortin failed to allege facts demonstrating that his 
counsel’s advice to reject the state’s plea offer constituted deficient performance, 
and Fortin was instead essentially arguing that “the mere fact that counsel 
advised him to go to trial and he lost at trial is per se ineffective assistance.”  (R., 
p.105.)  This Court may affirm the district court’s summary dismissal order on this 
alternative ground.   
Fortin has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him 
that, by rejecting the state’s plea offer, he potentially faced the imposition of 
consecutive sentences.  This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s 









 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Fortin’s post-conviction petition.  
 DATED this 25th day of January, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Mark W. Olson_________________ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
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